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Abstract
Backdoor attack against deep neural networks is currently
being profoundly investigated due to its severe security con-
sequences. Current state-of-the-art backdoor attacks require
the adversary to modify the input, usually by adding a trig-
ger to it, for the target model to activate the backdoor. This
added trigger not only increases the difficulty of launching
the backdoor attack in the physical world, but also can be
easily detected by multiple defense mechanisms. In this pa-
per, we present the first triggerless backdoor attack against
deep neural networks, where the adversary does not need
to modify the input for triggering the backdoor. Our at-
tack is based on the dropout technique. Concretely, we as-
sociate a set of target neurons that are dropped out during
model training with the target label. In the prediction phase,
the model will output the target label when the target neu-
rons are dropped again, i.e., the backdoor attack is launched.
This triggerless feature of our attack makes it practical in the
physical world. Extensive experiments show that our trig-
gerless backdoor attack achieves a perfect attack success rate
with a negligible damage to the model’s utility.
1 Introduction
Backdoor attack against deep neural networks (represented
by image and text classfiers) is currently being profoundly
investigated [8, 13, 20, 28, 30].1 Abstractly, a backdoored
model behaves normally on clean inputs and maliciously on
backdoored ones with respect to classifying them to a certain
target label/class. Successful backdoor attacks can cause se-
vere security consequences. For instance, an adversary can
implement a backdoor in a facial authentication system to al-
low her to bypass it. Current attacks construct a backdoored
input by adding a trigger to a clean input. A trigger can either
be a visual pattern [8, 20] or a hidden one [14].
State-of-the-art backdoor techniques achieve almost per-
fect attack success rate while causing negligible utility dam-
age on the model. However, a visible trigger on an input,
such as an image, is easy to be spotted by human and ma-
chine. Relying on a trigger also increases the difficulty of
1https://www.nist.gov/itl/ssd/trojai
mounting the backdoor attack in the physical world. For in-
stance, to trigger the backdoor of a real-world facial authen-
tication system, the adversary needs to put a trigger on her
face with the right angle towards the target system’s camera.
Moreover, a hidden trigger is harder to detect but it is even
more complicated to implement in the physical world (needs
to interfere with the signal to the target model). In addition,
current defense mechanisms can effectively detect and re-
construct the triggers given a model, thus mitigate backdoor
attacks completely [6, 28].
In this work, we introduce a new type of backdoor attack
that does not involve triggers. We name our attack the trig-
gerless backdoor attack. Instead of adding a trigger to the
inputs, we modify the model itself to realize the backdoor.
This means any clean input can trigger a successful back-
door attack. Our triggerless backdoor attack is based on the
dropout technique and a set of target neurons selected by the
adversary to trigger the attack. In detail, we train the model
to react maliciously, i.e, output the target label, when the tar-
get neurons are dropped. We then extend the dropout to the
prediction phase, however, with a very low drop rate, e.g.,
0.1%, to ensure the chance of activating the backdoor be-
havior. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack
can achieve effective performance with a negligible utility
drop. For instance, on the MNIST2 and CIFAR-103 datasets,
our attack achieves a perfect attack success rate (100%) with
only a 0.2% drop in the models’ utility.
We acknowledge that our attack is probabilistic, indicat-
ing that we cannot easily control when the attack can suc-
ceed. However, as we do not need to add triggers, the cur-
rent defenses cannot mitigate our attack. More importantly,
our attack can be straightforwardly launched in the physical
world as the adversary does not need to modify the model
inputs. Also, a more sophisticated adversary can set the ran-
dom seed – of the target model – and keep track of the num-
ber of queries applied to the model, to predict when it will
behave maliciously. Then, she just needs a single query to
launch the attack.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
paper.
1. We propose a new dimension for backdoor attacks,
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
3https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html
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namely, probabilistic backdoor attacks, and present the
first triggerless backdoor attack.
2. Our triggerless backdoor attack can be easily adjusted
to different use-cases by adjusting the probability of be-
having maliciously.
3. We evaluate our attack on three benchmark datasets and
show its effectiveness.
2 Related Works
In this section, we discuss the related works. We start with
current backdoor attacks and defenses. Then, we present the
adversarial examples and finally, a general overview of other
attacks against machine learning models.
The first work to explore the backdoor attacks was Bad-
nets [8]. Badnets backdoored image classification models
while using a white square as the trigger. It showed the ap-
plicability of the backdoor attack where the target model can
misclassify backdoored inputs while correctly classifying the
clean ones. Later, the Trojan attack was introduced [14],
where it proposed a more complex attack that simplifies the
assumptions in Badnets. Badnets assumed an adversary that
can control the training of the target model and has access
to the training data. Trojan attack on the other hand does
not require training data. It first reverse-engineers the model
to generate samples that are later used to backdoor the tar-
get model. Recently, another backdoor attack was intro-
duced that instead of using static triggers, it uses dynamic
ones [20]. In this dynamic backdoor attack, they propose dif-
ferent techniques that can generate different triggers and use
different locations of these triggers to implement the back-
door. So far all of these works have explored the backdoor at-
tack in image classification settings. BadNL further explores
the backdoor attack against text classification settings [3].
The difference between all of these attacks and our trigger-
less backdoor attack is that ours does not use triggers unlike
all of them.
Different works have explored defenses against backdoor
attacks. For instance, STRIP proposes a technique that clas-
sifies images to either be backdoored or clean [6]. Intuitively,
STRIP merges the target image with other different images.
Then it queries the model with the newly created images and
monitors the model’s output. If the model’s output is con-
stant, then the image is backdoored. Neural Cleanse presents
a different approach for defending against the backdoor at-
tack [28]. It tries to reverse-engineer the target model to re-
construct the backdoor triggers. Then, apply an anomaly de-
tection technique to identify if a subset of the reconstructed
triggers is indeed a backdoor trigger or the model is clean.
Both of these defenses assume that backdoor attacks are trig-
gered by added triggers to the input, which is not the case for
our triggerless backdoor attack. Hence why our triggerless
(a) Benign Behaviour (b) Backdoor Activated
Figure 1: An overview of the target model’s configuration with
the benign behaviour (Figure 1a) and the backdoor activated
(Figure 1b).
backdoor attack can bypass them, and in general, is more
robust against similar defenses.
A different attack but with a similar goal is adversarial ex-
amples. In adversarial examples, the adversary aims at mis-
predicting an input similar to the backdoor attack. However,
adversarial examples is a testing time attack, which means
the attack does not have any access to the training of the
model. But it can only have access to the target model af-
ter it is trained, unlike the backdoor attack where the ad-
versary modifies the training of the target model. Multiple
works have proposed different techniques for adversarial ex-
amples [1, 2, 5, 7, 11, 16–18, 24, 26, 29, 31].
There exist multiple different attacks against machine
learning than the ones briefly introduced here. For exam-
ple, multiple works have explored the membership inference
attacks and defenses [4, 9, 10, 12, 21, 22], where the attacker
tries to identify if an input was used into training the tar-
get model or not. Others explore dataset reconstruction at-
tack [19], where the adversary tries to reconstruct the dataset
used to update the model. Finally, multiple works explore
model stealing [15,25,27], where the adversary tries to steal
a model given only black-box access to it.
3 Triggerless backdoor
In this section, we first present the threat model considered
in this paper. Then, we introduce the triggerless backdoor
attack.
3.1 Threat Model
We follow the previously proposed threat model for back-
door attacks [3, 8, 20, 30], in which the adversary controls
the training of the target model. However, one important dif-
ference between the triggerless backdoor and other state-of-
the-art backdoor attacks is that it does not require to poison
or modify the training dataset. To mount the attack, the ad-
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versary needs to query the backdoored model with any clean
input until the backdoor is triggered, i.e., the model outputs
the target label.
3.2 Triggerless Backdoor Attack
We now introduce our triggerless backdoor attack. As pre-
viously mentioned, our triggerless backdoor attack does not
modify the inputs, but triggers the backdoor behavior when
specific – target – neurons are dropped.
To implement the attack, the adversary needs to first de-
cide on a subset of neurons, referred to as target neurons,
that will be associated with the backdoor. After deciding on
the target neurons, e.g., the red neuron in Figure 1, the ad-
versary can implement her attack as follows:
1. First, the adversary splits her dataset – normally – as if
training a benign model, i.e., dividing her datasets into
training and testing datasets.
2. Second, she applies dropout on all layers with target
neurons, we will refer to these layers as the target lay-
ers. The dropout rate is then picked by the adversary.
For instance, it can be the standard rate (50%) or a task-
specific one. For the remaining layers, the adversary is
free to use dropout or not.
3. Finally, the adversary trains the model normally with
the following exception. For a random subset of
batches, instead of using the ground-truth label, she
uses the target label, while dropping out the target neu-
rons instead of applying the regular dropout at the target
layer. More practically, instead of applying dropout on
the target layer for these batches, the adversary crafts a
mask that specifically drops the target neurons.
After the training is completed, the target model is ex-
pected to behave normally when the target neurons are not
dropped, as shown in Figure 1a (the figure is simplified, all
neurons except the target ones can be dropped and still the
model should behave benignly), and should trigger the back-
door behavior when the target neurons are dropped, as shown
in Figure 1b (in this case, the backdoor behavior is to predict
any input to the label 0). To mount the attack, the adver-
sary only needs to extend dropout to the prediction phase,
while reducing the dropout rate to avoid jeopardizing the
model’s utility, i.e., the model’s performance on inputs when
the backdoor is not triggered. As previously mentioned, the
triggerless backdoor attack is a probabilistic attack, which
means the adversary would need to query the model multiple
times until the backdoor is activated. However, the adversary
can easily control the probability of the backdoor activation
by altering the number of target neurons and the dropout
rate. Furthermore, a more advanced adversary can fix the
random seed in the target model. Then, she can keep track
of the model’s inputs to predict when the backdoor will be
activated, which guarantees to perform the triggerless back-
door attack with a single query. This advanced adversary
can also perform a denial of service attack by querying the
model to the point of activating the backdoor for the next in-
put. Hence, the next (the target input for the denial of service
attack) input will be predicted to the target label and not the
original one.
Since there is no trigger for our attack, the adversary has
to ensure that the backdoor behavior is not activated regu-
larly to avoid jeopardizing the model’s utility. Hence, there
is a trade-off between, on the one hand, the model’s util-
ity and the attack’s invisibility and, on the other hand, the
backdoor activation probability. The higher the backdoor ac-
tivation probability, the lower the model’s utility which can
increase the visibility of the attack. The ideal probability of
the backdoor activation of a triggerless backdoor with the N
target neurons in the same layer, and dropout rate at predic-
tion time Rdropout is:
R|N|dropout
More generally, if the target neurons are in different layers,
the probability is:
∏
i∈M
R|Ni|dropouti
where M is the set of layers containing the target neurons, Ni
is the number of target neurons at the layer i, and Rdropouti is
the dropout rate at prediction time at the ith layer.
It is important to note that these probabilities present the
theoretical bound for the triggerless backdoor attack, which
can deviate in practice due to the randomization introduced
while training the model. And the unequal effects of differ-
ent layers on the final output of the model. However, we
believe these probabilities can be used as a guideline by the
adversary to decide the number of neurons and the dropout
rate for a desired backdoor activation probability.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we first introduce our experimental settings,
then we present the evaluation of our triggerless backdoor
attack. Finally, we evaluate the different hyperparameters of
our attack.
4.1 Evaluation Settings
Datasets and Models: We follow the same evaluation set-
tings used by Salem et al. [20]. Namely, we use three bench-
mark datasets, including MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CelebA.4
For the MNIST and CelebA datasets, we build models from
scratch similar to the ones used in [20], and for the CIFAR-
10 dataset, we use a pre-trained VGG-19 model [23].
4http://mmlab.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/projects/CelebA.html
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Evaluation Metrics: For evaluating our triggerless back-
door attack, we adpot the Attack success rate and Model util-
ity used in previous works [3, 8, 20] and introduce three new
metrics, i.e., Number of queries, Label consistency, and Pos-
terior similarity. More specifically, we define our evaluation
metrics as follows:
• Attack success rate measures the success rate of the
backdoored model on the desired target inputs, i.e., the
inputs where the adversary expects the model to out-
put the target label. We calculate the attack success rate
by querying the target model with the test dataset while
setting the target label as the expected output. A per-
fect backdoor attack should have a 100% attack success
rate.
• Model utility measures how similar the backdoored
model is to a clean model. We calculate the model util-
ity by comparing the performance of the backdoored
model with a clean model on the testing dataset. A
perfect backdoor attack should result in a backdoored
model that has the same performance as the clean
model.
• Number of queries measures the number of repeated
queries for each input in the test dataset. We use this
metric to evaluate the performance and consistency of
our backdoor attack. For instance, we quantify the num-
ber of queries needed to trigger the backdoor. A low
number of queries, implies a better backdoor attack as
it can be easily launched.
• Label consistency quantifies how consistent the model’s
outputs are when the backdoor behavior is not triggered.
For the triggerless backdoor attack, the adversary needs
to enable the dropout while prediction. This may lead
the model to output different labels for the same input.
A perfect backdoored model should always assign the
same label to the same input (100% label consistency),
unless the backdoor is activated then it should predict
the target label. To calculate label consistency, we re-
peatedly query – the exact number of queries depends
on the experiment – the model with the same input and
monitor the predicted labels. If the predicted label re-
mains consistent except when the backdoor is activated,
we set the label consistency for this input to be 1, oth-
erwise, we set it to be 0. We calculate the label consis-
tency for all samples in the testing dataset and take their
average as the final label consistency score.
• Posterior similarity measures the cosine similarity of
the model’s prediction confidence score (i.e., posteri-
ors) for the same input. This is similar to label consis-
tency, but instead of focusing on the predicted labels,
it calculates the cosine similarity of each of the model’s
two consecutive posteriors on the same input. We repeat
this step for multiple times – depending on the number
of queries used – and take the average score for each in-
put. Finally, the final posterior similarity score is the av-
erage of all samples in the testing dataset. Again, larger
posterior similarity indicates better attack performance.
4.2 Triggerless Backdoor Attack
We now evaluate our triggerless backdoor attack. We use
all three datasets in our experiments and split each of them
into training and testing datasets as follows: For MNIST and
CIFAR-10, we use the default training and testing datasets.
For CelebA, we randomly sample 10,000 sample for both
training and testing datasets. Then, we follow Section 3.2 to
implement our triggerless backdoor in the target models. We
set the target neurons to be a single neuron in the second to
last layer.
For all datasets, we set the number of epochs to train the
target models to 50 and train 10 different models for each
dataset. After training, we set the dropout rate to 0.1% and
set the number of queries to 5,000. Figure 2 plots the evalu-
ation results (both mean and standard deviation) for all three
datasets.
As Figure 2a shows, our attacks are able to achieve al-
most a perfect success rate (100%) on all the three datasets.
It is important to recap that we calculate the attack success
rate with respect to the number of queries, i.e., we query
the input multiple times and consider the attack successful if
one of the outputs is the target label. Similarly, our attacks
achieve a perfect posterior similarity (1) for all three datasets
(Figure 2c).
However, for label consistency (Figure 2b), the result on
CelebA is only 0.78, unlike the results on CIFAR-10 and
MNIST both of which have a label consistency of 1. This is
because label consistency is a more strict evaluation metric,
i.e., for each input, as long as there is one different label, we
consider its label consistency to be 0. Intuitively, our results
for the CelebA dataset shows that the model’s outputs are
similar, however, the target model seldomly tends to predict
a different output label. To validate this, we repeat the label
consistency experiment for the CelebA dataset while count-
ing how many times the input is predicted to more than 2
labels, i.e., the target label and the original prediction. As
expected, the average number of times the input is predicted
to another label is only 23.4 (for 5,000 queries). In other
words, there is less than 0.5% chance that an input is pre-
dicted to a third label.
Finally, for model utility (Figure 2d), our models are able
to achieve a similar performance as clean models. For in-
stance, our backdoored models achieve 92%, 67%, and 99%
accuracy for CIFAR-10, CelebA, and MNIST, respectively,
which is only about 0.2%, 1.1%, and 0.2% lower than the
clean models.
These results show the efficacy of our triggerless backdoor
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Figure 2: Evaluation of the triggerless backdoor attack when setting the number of queries to 5,000, on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
CelebA datasets. The x-axis represents the different datasets and the y-axis represents the attack success rate (Figure 2a), label
consistency (Figure 2b), posterior similarity (Figure 2c), and accuracy on the clean testing dataset (Figure 2d).
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Figure 3: Evaluation of varying the number of queries on the
CIFAR-10 dataset. The x-axis represents the number of queries
and the y-axis represents the different metrics values.
attack on all three datasets. Moreover, it is important to note
that one of the most important advantages of our attack is
that it does not modify the inputs dissimilar to other state-of-
the-art backdoor attacks [8, 14, 20].
4.3 Hyperparameters Evaluation
We now evaluate the effect of varying the hyperparameters of
our triggerless backdoor attack. For all of our experiments in
this section, we follow the previously introduced evaluation
settings (Section 4.1) with some exceptions that we state for
each experiment separately.
Number of Queries: First, we explore the effect of varying
the number of queries on our attack. We use the CIFAR-10
dataset and fix the other experimental settings. We try from
1 query to 10,000 queries with a step of 500 and plot the
results in Figure 3.
As expected, a larger number of queries result in a better
attack success rate. For instance, our triggerless backdoor
attack achieves approximately 46%, 80%, and 92% attack
success rate for 500, 1,500, and 2,500 queries, respectively.
For both, the label consistency and posterior similarity the
performance stays consistent even with a larger number of
queries. For instance, the difference between the label con-
sistency for 500 and 10,000 queries is less than 0.06%, which
demonstrates the robustness of our attack.
Number of Target Neurons: Second, we explore the ef-
fect of increasing the number of target neurons, i.e., the neu-
rons that need to be dropped for the backdoor to be acti-
vated. We use the CelebA dataset for this experiment. We
consider models with different range of target neurons, in-
cluding 1,10, 20, and 50.
With an increase in the number of target neurons, we need
to increase the dropout rate as well since the previously used
dropout rate (0.1%) does not drop enough neurons. There-
fore, we set the dropout rate to 10% for our experiments.
We evaluate the backdoored models with a different num-
ber of queries and plot the results in Figure 4. First, we
compare the attack success rate of the models with a dif-
ferent number of target neurons. As expected, fewer target
neurons lead to a higher possibility of triggering the back-
door. For instance, backdooring a model with 1 target neuron
can achieve perfect a success rate with less than 500 queries,
while a model with 50 target neurons can merely get a 15%
attack success rate with 5,000 queries.
Second, Figure 4b compares the label consistency of the
models. Contrary to the attack success rate, label consis-
tency increases with the larger number of target neurons. The
maximum label consistency score that a model with a single
target neuron achieves is about 35% – note that here we are
using a dropout rate of 10% but Figure 2b uses 0.1%, hence
the difference in performance – which is less than the half of
what a model with 50 target neurons achieve. The gap be-
tween the scores of both models even increases with a larger
number of queries. We observe similar behavior for the pos-
terior similarity but with smaller performance gap between
different models.
Finally, for the model utility of different models. As ex-
pected, a larger number of target neurons make the model
more stable as to trigger the backdoor more neurons are
needed. For instance, there is a gap of about 10% between
the performance of the single target neuron and 50 target
neurons. It is important to note that these results are with
a dropout rate of 10%, however, as previously shown, a sin-
gle target neuron model can achieve better results in term of
label consistency, posterior similarity, and model utility with
a lower dropout rate but at the expense of more number of
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Figure 4: Evaluation of varying the number of target neurons using the CelebA dataset. The x-axis represents the number of quries
and the y-axis represents the attack success rate (Figure 4a) and label consistency (Figure 4b).
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Figure 5: Evaluation of varying the dropout rate while pre-
diction using the MNIST dataset. The x-axis represents the
dropout rate, and the y-axis represents the different metrics
scores.
queries to achieve a perfect attack success rate.
Dropout Rate: Third, we explore the effect of using differ-
ent dropout rates for prediction. We use the MNIST dataset
for this experiment. We try different dropout rates including
0.1%, 1%, and 10%, and set the number of queries to 100.
Figure 5 depicts the result.
Both model utility and label consistency decrease with
larger dropout rates. Posterior similarity also drops, how-
ever, with negligible quantity, i.e., it drops by less than
0.01%. Moreover, the attack success rate increases signifi-
cantly with a higher dropout rate. For instance, using 100
queries can already achieve a 100% attack success rate when
the dropout rate is 10% compared to only 20% when the
dropout rate is 0.01%.
Different Target Layer: For all the previous experiments,
we consider the second to last layer as the target layer. We
now investigate whether using different layers for the tar-
get neurons can influence our attack. We use the CIFAR-10
dataset to train a triggerless backdoored model with a single
target neuron in the first fully connected layer, i.e., the third
to last layer. We compare the performance of the trained
model with the one previously used in Section 4.2, i.e., the
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Number of Queries
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Label Consistency (2nd to last)
Attack Success Rate (2nd to last)
Label Consistency (3rd to last)
Attack Success Rate (3rd to last)
Figure 6: Evaluation of using different layers for the target
neuron using the CIFAR-10 dataset. The x-axis represents the
number of queries, and the y-axis represents the different met-
rics.
target neuron is in the second to last layer. We plot the com-
parison of both models in Figure 6 for a different number of
queries using the CelebA dataset.
As the figure shows, both models have a small perfor-
mance gap when considering the attack success rate, e.g.,
both are able to achieve 100% attack success rate at about
5,000 queries. However, for label consistency, there is a
larger gap between the two models. Using the second to last
layer for the target neuron achieves a better performance than
the other one. This is expected as the last layers have a more
direct effect on the final predicted label, i.e., it is the input to
the last layer which performs final step of prediction.
5 Conclusion
Backdoor attacks against deep neural networks received a lot
of attention recently. However, all current works implement
backdoor attacks by using triggers in the input domain, e.g.,
using a white or colored square as a trigger, which hinders
these attacks from being deployed in the physical world.
In this work, we introduce the first triggerless backdoor
attack, where no triggers need to be added to the model in-
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puts. This type of backdoor has two main advantages. First,
it can be easily applied in the physical world since inputs are
not modified. Second, it can bypass state-of-the-art defenses
mechanisms in this field, which detect backdoors by finding
triggers.
Our attack is implemented by associating a set of neurons
being dropped out during training with a target label. The
attack will be launched when target labels are dropped again
during the prediction phase. Our evaluation shows that our
triggerless backdoor attack indeed performs as expected and
can easily achieve a perfect attack success rate with a neg-
ligible damage to models’ utility. Moreover, we evaluate
different hyperparameters of our attack and shows its flex-
ibility being adapted to various use cases. For instance, the
adversary can easily control how often the model triggers the
backdoor behavior by adapting the dropout rate.
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